We consider an alternating oer bargaining model in which the players may agree to call in an arbitrator in case of disagreement. The main message of our study is that the mere presence of an arbitrator -who can only become active with the consent of both parties -in the background of negotiations may e n tirely drive their outcome. We discuss the implications of this result both for theories of arbitration and for the interpretation of cooperative bargainining solutions.
Introduction
In standard bargaining models the only alternative to agreement on a partition is disagreement. Since ancient times, however, social institutions have oered another possibility for resolving disputes when they come to a deadlock: the parties can call in a third party who is perceived as impartial, the arbitrator. While there exists a huge industrial relation literature on the eects of arbitration on negotiations, and while there are several formal models of the arbitration phase itself (e.g. Brams (1990) , Farber and Bazerman (1986) ), the link between the arbitration outcome and the bargaining outcome has not received much formal attention in economics 1 . This may be due to the perception that, if agreements have to be self-enforcing (i.e., equilibria), the presence of an arbitrator in the background should not matter, at least in the case in which the consent of both parties is needed to take the dispute to arbitration. In that case, it would appear, the player who stands to lose by calling in the arbitrator -with respect to the standard bargaining outcome -may simply ignore any proposal of arbitration. By contrast, it has been observed how in other cases the presence of an arbitrator can make a dierence 2 . In this paper we will show how and why`arbitration matters' even when no party can enforce arbitration on its own, and even when the arbitrator's services are not used.
Our modelling strategy is very simple. We consider the basic version of the standard alternating oers bargaining model (Rubinstein (1982) ) in which two parties negotiate over the division of a pie. The only modication we add is this: at any point in time, the parties can agree to call in the arbitrator. The arbitrator's decision is commonly known and binding; but both parties must agree to call in the arbitrator for the dispute to be settled by him. In other words, either party has power of veto on the event that the dispute goes to arbitration 3 . While we discuss later the relevance of this particular setting , we anticipate now, in summary, its interesting analytical implications.
The main message of our study is that the sheer presence of an arbitrator -who can 1 A notable and recent exception is Compte and Jehiel (1995) , which w e discuss later in the paper. 2 Consider, for example what Brams and III (1983) term`the paradox of arbitration'. See also Brams and III (1986) and, more recently, Zeng et al. (1996) . Compte and Jehiel (1995) study the case where either party has the power of calling in the arbitrator. only become active with the consent of both parties -in the background of negotiations may entirely drive their outcome. More precisely, our rst result states that (as long as costs of arbitration are suciently small) there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the modied standard noncooperative bargaining model which coincidesmodulo the arbitration cost -with the arbitrated outcome, no matter what this outcome is. So, if for example the arbitrator deems it appropriate to assign almost the entire cake to one of the two players, there will be a subgame perfect equilibrium where the veto power of the disadvantaged player comes to nothing: he will voluntarily accept (and propose) a partition that assigns him a minimal part of the cake. In the limit as the cost of arbitration tends to zero, any arbitrated outcome can be exactly supported in equilibrium as a negotiated outcome (for any discount factor).
When the arbitrated partition is \unbalanced" (particularly favourable to one of the two players), the standard Rubinstein outcome can also be supported in equilibrium. We show that, as is usual in this type of models, the presence of two equilibria in fact creates a continuum of equilibrium partitions, and even allows for the possibility of equilibrium delays: However, we also show that when the arbitrated outcome is suciently close (depending on the discount factor) to the fty-fty partition, the two equilibria can no longer coexist: the arbitration-driven equilibrium partition becomes the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game. Note well: because of the Pareto optimality o f the standard bargaining outcome, even in the case where the arbitrated outcome is not unbalanced, at least one of the players must be worse o by submitting to arbitration. Yet, he has no alternative in equilibrium but to voluntarily submit.
There is a second viewpoint that has raised our interest in this study of arbitration, which is more methodological in nature. Arbitration is important when it comes to justifying and interpreting cooperative bargaining solutions. It is sometimes informally suggested that the outcomes of such solutions can be (a) interpreted as arbitrated outcomes, and (b) used to predict the outcome of noncooperative negotiations when the parties may resort to arbitration. In particular, in his inuential textbook Myerson (1991) asserts that:
\The outcomes of eective negotiations in which the players have equal opportunity to participate should bethe same as the recommendations that would be made by an impartial arbitrator who knows the information that is common knowledge among the players during the negotiations." (p.374)
Myerson suggests that a \focal arbitrator" may beable to drive the attention of the players to a particular equilibrium. Our results allow one to qualify the line of argument suggested by Myerson. The assertion that, because arbitration can drive the outcome of noncooperative negotiations, an arbitration model can be used to study their outcome is broadly supported. Yet, in our case the role of the arbitrator is quite dierent from that envisaged by M y erson: it is not to render a particular equilibrium out of a given set focal, but rather to determine the equilibrium set itself.
We believe that our model provides a formal basis to interpret the axioms characterising cooperative bargaining solutions as describing features of the behaviour of an impartial arbitrator, rather than describing features of an unmodeled noncooperative negotiation procedure. This distinction is important: game theorist, in fact, seem to be divided as to which interpretation is the more appropriate. For example, while the axioms characterising the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) were certainly thought by Nash himself as summarising the features of a noncooperative game, those same axioms are often seen to beinterpreted as \fairness requirements" for \impartial" arbitration 4 . We nd that, in general, the link between the axioms characterising a particular cooperative solution and the structure of a noncooperative bargaining procedure implementing that solution is somewhat obscure. Our model, on the other hand, provides an explicit noncooperative structure through which a given partition chosen by an arbitrator can be implemented. First, a set of axioms that allows a direct and transparent ethical interpretation can be used to select the appropriate arbitrated outcome. Then, players who play noncooperatively according to the rules of our model will reach an agreement consistent with that arbitrated outcome.
More in general, we hope that our approach can provide a basis for the study of the 4 For example, Binmore (1997) argues strongly against the fair arbitration interpretation of the NBS, whereas Luce and Raia (1957) promoted the latter interpretation, also upheld recently by Border and Segal (1997). fascinating phenomenon whereby our notions of \fairness" aect negotiations between selsh rational players.
The Model
Two players bargain over how to split between them a surplus normalised to unity. The players' utilities are linear in the share of the surplus which they receive, and they discount utility o v er time by a factor 2 (0; 1). As in the standard alternating oers model, each player i, i = 1 ; 2, in turn proposes a partition of the surplus, which his opponent can either accept, ending the game, or reject. In addition, when rejecting a proposal the responding player can either follow with a counter-oer in the subsequent round; or propose to call in an arbitrator to settle the dispute. The outcome of the arbitration is common knowledge, and results in the partition (s 1 ; s 2 ), with s 1 ; s 2 0, and s 1 + s 2 = 1 (i.e. the arbitrated outcome is always ecient). However, we assume that arbitration is costly 5 , weighing equally 6 on both players; consequently, we assume that the actual payos for the players are reduced by the same amount " min[s 1 ; s 2 ]. If arbitration is proposed, player j has to decide whether to accept, in which case the game ends with the players receiving the arbitrated outcome net of costs; or to reject and let player i again propose a partition of the surplus in the following round. The game continues in this away until a proposal is accepted; in case of perpetual disagreement, both players end up with a null payo. Consequently, we can distinguish two types of subgames: (a) subgame G i , which starts with the proposal of a partition by player i ; and (b) subgame D i , which starts with the choice of player i whether to accept the proposal of an arbitration or make a counteroer in the following round. All our results go through when arbitration costs are zero; however we include positive arbitration costs since they appear to be an important feature of arbitration in practice (e.g. Milner (1993) ). 6 We stick to this assumption for notational simplicity, as allowing for dierent arbitration costs for the two players would not aect the quality of the results. The detailed structure of the game is depicted in Figure 2 ; it begins at time t = 0 with negotiations between the two players: player 1 proposes the partition If player 2 rejects and proposes arbitration, the game moves to a subgame of type D 1 , in which player 1 has to decide whether to agree on going to arbitration (y), in which case players' payo pair is (s 1 "; s 2 "); or to reject and enter again a subgame of type G 1 , at time t = 1, in which he is once again proposer. Alternatively, if player 2 rejects to make a counteroer to player 1, the game moves to the following round, at time t = 1, entering a subgame of type G 2 . Symmetrically, player 1 can either accept (A) -ending the game-, reject and make a counteroer (R) (entering a subgame of type G 1 in the following period), or reject and propose arbitration (S, for \Solomon"), in which case the game moves to a subgame of type D 2 . Now player 2 can either accept arbitration (y), yielding (s 1 "; s 2 "); or reject (n) and make a counteroer in the following round, so that play moves to a subgame of type G 2 , and so on. In the next propositions we will completely characterise the solution to this game. First of all notice that all subgames of the same kind starting with a move b y player i are identical and have the same set of equilibrium payos. Then, let g i j and g i j (with i; j = 1; 2) be the supremum and the inmum payos, respectively, for player j in any subgame perfect equilibrium of subgames of type G i where player i makes an oer. Similarly, let d i j and d i j , respectively, be the supremum and inmum equilibrium payo to player j in any subgame perfect equilibrium of subgames of type D i where player i has to decide whether to accept going to the arbitrator, or to reject arbitration and make a counteroer in the next round.
By standard arguments, it follows that subgame perfection requires that the following hold: ; (ii) reject any partition which yields him any x < g j i and accept any x g j i ; (iii) always accept arbitration when player j proposes it; (iv) always propose arbitration when rejecting an oer. Checking for subgame perfection of (i) and (ii) is straightforward, thus omitted. For (iii) to beoptimal, by parts (i) and (ii) of the equilibrium strategies it must bethe case that in subgames of type D i player i prefers the arbitrated partition to g i i one period later; or, (1 + ) 8 optimality is immediately veried for " " .
Finally, for (iv) to beoptimal, it must bethe case that the payo that player i gets when rejecting an oer in G i and proposing arbitration is not lower than the payo he gets by starting G i one period later instead. Given part (iii) of j's equilibrium strategy, the former payo is s i ". Therefore this leads to the same inequality considered for (iii).
In the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 players avoid waste by agreeing immediately and saving the arbitration cost. This gives an advantage to the rst proposer, in that he manages to appropriate completely the benet from not going into arbitration in equilibrium. The above proposition applies, xing " and , to a wide range of arbitrated outcomes; furthermore, it follows trivially that as the arbitration cost grows smaller and smaller, it is possible to support exactly as a negotiated s.p.e. partition any arbitrated partition, even one which is unbalanced in the extreme, in the sense that it assigns the whole surplus to just one of the bargainers. In summary:
Corollary 1 So, when players may propose arbitration at no cost, even an arbitrarily small cost of delay is sucient to destroy any bargaining power the player who is disadvantaged by the arbitrator may have in negotiations. This may seem surprising: one conjecture that would seem plausible is that if a player got very little in the arbitrated outcome and the discount factor was very high, he would have been able to reject (at cost near zero) both unfavourable bargaining proposals and proposals of going to arbitration, to counterpropose instead the Rubinsteinian share in the next period. A proposal of arbitration is just like the proposal of a specic partition. So, if -say -(s 1 ; s 2 ) = (1; 0) and player 1 proposes arbitration after rejecting an interior partition, why shouldn't player 2 just reject and propose the standard partition, as he would do in the standard bargaining model? The mistake i n this argument is that it overlooks the`commitment eect' which is created by the distinguished nature of the arbitration proposal. Think of why committing to always rejecting any proposal that yields him less than 1 (and always proposing (1; 0)) is not a credible strategy for player 1 in the standard bargaining model: if player 2`called the blu' and counterproposed, say, ( + ; 1 ) for a small , then player 1 w ould be better o by accepting, since the maximum he can get otherwise is . But in the model with arbitration, player 1 can credibly commit to rejecting a partition yielding him ( + ), since the maximum he can get is now closer to 1 (for small ") than . This eect is reminiscent of the one occurring in models with double-sided outside options (see Ponsati and Sakovics (1995) ), with the important dierence that in our case the value of the outside option is endogenously determined in equilibrium (depending on the s.p.e. of the subgames D i ).
The next proposition will show that the type of equilibrium analysed above is unique when the arbitrated partition is not exceedingly favourable to one of the bargainers, where the denition of`favourable' depends on the discount factor. We say that arbitrated outcome is balanced if
Note that the condition of balancedness, together with the eciency of the arbitrated partition, implies that s i < 1 1+ " 8i, and therefore it is equivalent t o 8 i .
The following lemma gives conditions under which the maximum s.p.e. payo for a player in subgames where he is the proposer is greater than the maximum s.p.e. payo to that player in subgames when the opponent is a proposer, and will be useful in the proof of proposition 2.
Lemma 1 If the arbitrated outcome is balanced and, for some i; s i " g i i , then g i i g j i 8 2 (0; 1). We will show that in this case i would be willing to accept g j i in the subgame G j for some small ;thus contradicting the denition of g j i . In fact, suppose that i rejected the partition yielding him g j i and made a counteroer. Then he would get at most g i i : but g i i < g i i < g j i g i i < g j i for suciently small. Suppose, on the other hand, that i rejected the partition yielding him g j i and proposed arbitration. Then, if j accepted, i could obtain at most s i " g i i < g j i < g j i for a small . If j rejected arbitration, i could obtain at most g j i < g j i for a small .
Proposition 2 If the arbitrated outcome is balanced, then 8 2 (0; 1) 9" such that 8" < " the unique s.p.e. payo pair of the game is (s 1 + "; s 2 "):
Proof. We will show that g i i s i + " g i i 8i, (provided " is suciently small) from which the conclusion of the statement follows immediately.
We proceed in two steps: we begin by proving the rst inequality, that is, in any subgame G i in which he is the proposer, player i cannot obtain more than s i + " in equilibrium (step 1). Next, we prove that the second inequality has to hold, that is, in any subgame in which he is the proposer, player i must obtain at least s i +" in equilibrium (step 2).
Step 1: g i i s i + ".
Suppose to the contrary that g i i > s i + " . Distinguish two cases:
We will show that, at an equilibrium, in both cases player j will reject the proposal (g i i ; 1 g i i ): In particular, we will show that there exists a counterproposal by player j which is more protable to him than accepting, and which will be accepted by player i.
Case 1. Consider the following action by player j: reject the partition (g i i ; 1 g i i ) and propose arbitration.
Player i will accept this proposal in equilibrium, since by rejecting he can get at most g i i , while by accepting he gets , 1 g i i < 1 s i " = s j ". Case 2. Consider the following action by player j: reject and propose the partition (g i i + ;1 g i i ), with a small strictly positive n umberto be determined later.
It must bethe case that in equilibrium player i accepts this proposal. In fact, if he rejects and proposes a new partition he gets at most g i i < g i i + while if he rejects and proposes arbitration, there are two possibilities. If arbitration is accepted by player j, player i gets s i " g i i + (the inequality following from the denition of case 2). On the other hand, if arbitration is rejected, a game of type G j is induced in the next period, so that player i gets at most g j i g i i < g i i + (where the rst inequality follows from lemma 1).
We m ust now v erify that it is protable for player j to make the proposal just described, rather than accept 1 g i i . This will be the case if: provided is chosen small enough. This shows that it is protable for player j to make the proposal described in this subcase, and completes the proof of Step 1.
Step 2: s i + " g i i .
We will rst show that at an equilibrium player j will not beable to improve on the partition (s i + "; s j ").
To see this, suppose rst that player j rejected this proposal and induced a game G j one period later. By Step 1 the maximum he could get by this action is s j + ". As in the proof of proposition 1 dene
(1 + ) .
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Thus, for " < " , it must be s j " > ( s j + " ), so that player j would not nd it protable to follow this action.
On the other hand, suppose that player j rejected the partition (s i + "; s j ")and proposed arbitration. In an s.p.e., player i would accept as long as " < " , since by
Step 1 h e w ould obtain at most (s i + ") b y rejecting and inducing a game G i .
This shows that, if " < " ; at an s.p.e. player j will accept any proposal yielding him strictly more than s j ", and will be indierent between (a) accepting a share s j " and (b) rejecting and proposing arbitration. However, there cannot be an s.p.e. where player j follows action (b) when player i proposes the partition (s i + "; s j "): For, in that case player i would be better o by proposing (s i + " ;s j "+) for some < 2 " , which would beaccepted. Therefore, at any s.p.e. where player i proposes the partition (s i + "; s j "), player j will accept. (implied by balancedness and eciency of arbitration); or reject arbitration and make a counteroer, obtaining g i i one period later. Turning to part (ii) of the equilibrium strategy, note that it is optimal for player i to reject any partition which yields him a payo less that g j i , since he could otherwise counteroer (g i 1 ; g i 2 ) in the following round, which w ould be accepted and would yield him g i i =g j i .F or part (iii) of the equilibrium strategy, note 
To see that i would accept the proposal at an s.p.e., observe that if he made a counteroer he could get at most g i i < g i i +
On the other hand, if he proposed arbitration, either j would accept and i would get Step , g i i 1
1 + Suppose then that it was optimal for j to reject and propose arbitration. If i rejected, then j would get at most (1 g i i ) i n t h e next period, yielding the contradiction g i i 1 (1 g i i )
, g i i 1
Therefore, if it was optimal for j to reject at an s.p.e., i would accept arbitration. This can only be the case if = g i i = g i i = g j j = g j j .
Intermediate Equilibria
As is the case in other bargaining models with non-unique equilibria (see for instance Haller and Holden (1990) , Fernandez and Glazer (1991) , Avery and Zemsky (1994) , , , Ponsati and Sakovics (1995) and Manzini (1996) among others), in our model as well it is possible to support a whole range of ecient equilibrium payos when there exist two extreme equilibrium payos, as characterised in the previous propositions. We can thus establish the following: (1 + )
2(1 + ) s j + " < 1 + + 2 " < 1 + + 1 1 + = 1 1 + Similarly, s i " > 1 1 + 2 " > 1 1 + + 1 1 + = 1 + The rest of the proof is divided into three parts. In the rst two parts we show that no partitions which yield player i a p a y o outside the ranges specied in the proposition can be supported in equilibrium. In part III of the proof we i n troduce a pair of strategies which support the s.p.e. outcome introduced above.
Part I: Subgames in which player i is the proposer.
We proceed in two steps.
We prove this by contradiction. Suppose that, on the contrary:
Now, consider two possible cases: Case a: s i " > g i i .
In this case player j can reject and propose arbitration, which i would accept (by denition of case a). This action is protable for player j, since now he gets s j " > 1 g i i (recall that g i i > s i + " , 1 g i i < s j " ). Case b: s i " g i i .
In this case, player j could reject and counteroer the partition which gives player i the share g i i + , which player i would accept. In fact, when rejecting player i could either make a counteroer, or propose arbitration. If the former, player i could obtain at most g i i < g i i + . Alternatively, if player i rejected to propose arbitration, he would receive s i " < g i i + (if arbitration were accepted); or 2 g i i < g i i + if arbitration were rejected (this is so because if player j rejects arbitration then, it must bethe case that s j " < g j j . Step 2: g i i 1 1+
. In this case, player j would receive a p a y o of at most
1+
. Suppose now player j were oered exactly 1+ : is there any strategy which would ensure that he obtains a higher payo? In case of a rejection, player j can either (i) propose arbitration, or (ii) make a counteroer. If (i), player i would surely accept arbitration, since by so doing he obtains a payo which is in excess of the highest payo he could achieve if he were to reject arbitration and make a counteroer in the following round, since Part II:Subgames in which player i is the responder.
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As above, we proceed in two steps.
Step 1: g j i
1+
. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose that, on the contrary, g j i <
1 + g j j = 1 g j i > 1 1 + Then player i could reject and counteroer in the following period a partition yielding player j a payo of g j j + >
, which player j will accept, given that by rejecting he can obtain either g j j , b y making a counterproposal in the subsequent round; or s j " < 1+ < g j j + if he proposes arbitration (which is accepted by player i, since in Part I we showed that s i " > g i i = ( s i + " ) when " < " ). Such a deviation is protable for player i, since his payo becomes
Step 2: g j i s i ".
As for step 2 in part I, could player i improve on his payo by rejecting a partition which yields him s i "? He can either reject and make a counteroer in the following round, yielding g i i = (s i + ") < s i " when " < " ; or reject and propose arbitration. But this is never optimal for player i; since: (a) if s j " > g j j , then player j accepts arbitration, so that i cannot improve on the initially proposed payo of s i ", whereas if (b) s j " g j j , then player j could reject arbitration, and oer to player i in the following round at most max[g i i ; s i " ] = s i " . P art III:Equilibrium strategies. Let y 2 s j + "; 1 1+
. Then, using standard arguments, strategies which support the equilibrium of Proposition 5 are for instance for player i (player j, respectively) to claim x ( y ) for himself, accept any proposal which yields him at least 1 y ( 1 x ) and reject any other proposal; in case of a deviation, play reverts to the strategies which yield the worst payo for the deviator 9 , that is either those supporting the Rubinstenian 9 For the reader's convenience, we here report such strategies. Those which support the Rubinstenian equilibrium are for player i (resp. j): i propose the partition which give him a payo of It is easy to check that the strategies sketched above constitute an s.p.e. In fact, suppose i = 1, so that player 1 is the rst proposer. Then if he proposed any partition yielding him a payo x 6 = x , given his strategy player 2 would reject, and both players would revert to the Rubinstenian equilibrium play, that is, player 2 would propose the partition
, which playe r 1 w ould accept. By so doing, however, player 1 obtains a payo of 1+ one period later, which is less than the lowest possible value of x . Furthermore, player 2 cannot improve on his payo by accepting a partition which yields a payo dierent from 1 x , as by rejecting and switching to the Rubinstenian play he can secure a payo whose present discounted value is 1+ 1 x . Suppose now i = 2 , so that equilibrium is reached eciently on the partition (y ; 1 y ). As above, player j = 1 cannot improve on his payo by making a dierent oer, as given his strategy, player 2 would reject and then revert to play arbitration driven equilibrium strategies, that is, he would propose arbitration, which w ould be accepted, yielding player 2 a payo of s 1 " 1 y , and playe r 1 a p a y o equal to s 2 " s 2 +" y . This also shows that player 2 cannot protably accept a partition yielding a payo smaller than 1 y , since by following his equilibrium strategy -that is, by rejecting and proposing arbitration -he can secure a p a y o of s 1 " 1 y .
Our results are summarised in Figure 3 , where we represent the combinations of values of s 1 and s 2 (on the horizontal and vertical axis, respectively) for which the various equilibrium regimes can be supported, for any given value of and "; when " < " . The thick lines represent combinations of s 1 and s 2 which support the Rubinstenian equilibrium. The portion of the -45 degree line in correspondence of the bracket selects pairs of arbitrated outcomes which support the arbitration-driven equilibrium. Where propose arbitration otherwise); iv reject arbitration (reject arbitration when s j 1+ + ", and do not reject it otherwise).
Strategies which support the arbitration driven equilibrium are for player i = 1; 2: i propose the partition which yields him a payo of s i + " and s j " to his opponent; ii reject any partition which yields him any x < s i " and accept any x s i "; iii always accept arbitration when player j proposes it; iv always propose arbitration when rejecting an oer. the bracket overlaps with the thick lines both regimes can be supported, which allows for a multiplicity of equilibrium payos to be sustained in equilibrium, as explained in Proposition 5.
So far we have considered only ecient agreements. Similarly to other models of this kind, the existence of two extreme equilibrium payos in fact creates the possibility of delayed equilibrium agreements. These sort of ineciencies are dealt with in the next section.
Eciencies and Ineciencies
One important purpose of (costly) arbitration is to increase the parties' willingness to reach a negotiated agreement instead of resorting to arbitration. The fact that such an institution exists reminds the parties that a settlement to the negotiations can always be achieved, and the cost involved in such a process should discourage lengthy disputes and encourage the bargainers to reach an agreement.
A main feature of our model is that both bargainers know what the outcome would beif an arbitrator were called in, so that they cannot bedriven into arbitration by the belief that they would get some better deal. Consequently, it turns out that, as long as arbitration is costly, there can be no equilibrium in which the arbitrated outcome is implemented. This prevents the existence of the family of equilibria which are inecient because part of the surplus is lost in arbitration costs.
Proposition 6 Arbitration can never be supported in equilibrium if " > 0 .
Proof. Suppose not, so that " > 0 and arbitration can besupported in equilibrium.
Then, along the equilibrium path it must be that player i (with i = 1 ; 2 ) makes a proposal which player j rejects to counteroer arbitration, which player i accepts. Now let x be player i's claim in the oered partition. Clearly, to be in equilibrium it must be that 1 x s j ", since otherwise player j would bebetter o by accepting the proposal. That can be rearranged as x s i + ". Suppose now that player i proposed instead a partition in which his claim was x 0 = s i + " < x , leaving s j " + to player j, where is a small positive constant satisfying < 2". Then it is clearly not optimal for player j to conform to his equilibrium strategy and reject such oer, since accepting player i' proposal gives him a greater payo. Furthermore, such deviation is protable for player i, since by so doing he obtains s i + " > s i " (given that < 2 " ).
This shows that incomplete information and heterogeneous beliefs should be an important factor in any story that explains why inecient arbitration is observed in reality.
However, there are other types of ineciency which can besupported in equilibrium. They do not arise from arbitration being a costly process; conversely, these ineciencies exist when arbitration costs are suciently small (but they may still be positive), and take the form of delayed (bargained) agreements, as the following proposition illustrates: Proposition 7 If 0 < " < " , and s 2 < Proof. First of all, recall that when " < " both the Rubinstenian and the arbitrationdriven equilibria can obtain. Then, strategies that support this equilibrium are: At time t and until time T, player 1 proposes the partition 1 T t (1 z ); T t (1 z ) and rejects any oer which yields less than s 1 ", while player 2 proposes the partition T t z ; 1 T t z and rejects any oer which yields less than
1+
; both players never propose arbitration and never accept arbitration when it is called for by their opponent; at time T, player i oers a partition yielding player 1 a payo of z , which is accepted. Both players punish deviations by reverting play to the worst equilibrium for the deviator (i.e. either those supporting the Rubinstenian s.p.e. payo, as specied in Proposition 3, or those supporting the arbitration driven equilibrium, as specied in Proposition 1, as explained in the proof of Proposition 5). We now show that the payos specied above can besupported in equilibrium.
To conclude the proof, notice that for the interval is not empty.
What we learn from this result is that allowing for the possibility of arbitration, even with complete information, may have a negative eect on negotiations, since it creates the scope for delays which were impossible in the classic bargaining model. This rather perverse feature is due to the fact that, although arbitration is never observed in equilibrium (Proposition 6), the out of equilibrium paths leading to arbitration may be used strategically. The variety of threats thus generated accounts for multiple equilibria which sustain delayed agreements. Note also that -as the proof illustrates -non-stationary strategies are crucial to sustain delays. Arguably, imposing Markov behaviour would thus constitute one plausible way to rule out inecient equilibria.
The Role of : A Comparison with the Outside Option Model
In this section we contrast our arbitration model with outside option models, by analysing the role of the discount factor. It could be argued that introducing the possibility of resorting to an arbitrator is tantamount t o i n troducing a xed outside option for the two bargainers which can betaken without delay. However, this is not the case. The crucial dierence is that for the arbitrated outcome to obtain it is needed that both bargainers agree on it. Let us consider the simple alternating oers bargaining model in which player 2 can take up his outside option after rejecting player 1's oer, in which case players obtain a the outside option equilibrium obtains (see Figure 4) . Notice that at = b , x 1 ( b ) = 1 b 2 . Consequently, the equilibrium share for player 1 is continuous and monotonically decreasing in .
Let us now turn to the model with arbitration. Consequently, when s 1 s 2 , at = both equilibria yield the same payo to player 1, whereas if s 1 < s 2 the Rubinstenian equilibrium payo evaluated at = is s 2 +" > s 1 + " : in such case, an upper semi-discontinuity i n t h e payos arises. This situation is depicted in Figures 5 and 6 . Solid lines represent the equilibrium payo schedule for player 1 in the arbitration-driven equilibrium case (s 1 + ") and Rubinstenian equilibrium case (
); the shaded area highlights the presence of multiple equilibria. This sort of discontinuity would appear if one were to consider a two-sided outside option model, as in Ponsati and Sakovics (1995) . However, by contrasting their model with the one presented in this paper it is possible to highlight some important dierences. If one were to interpret the arbitrated outcome as an outside option payo vector (s 1 "; s 2 "), their main result would imply that whenever the outside option is such that at least one of the players stands to gain by calling in the arbitrator -with respect to negotiated outcome -, only the arbitration driven equilibrium would obtain, whereas if neither of the players preferred the arbitrated outcome to the bargained one, a multiplicity of payos could be supported in equilibrium 12 . On the contrary, in our model the fact that arbitration is preferred by at least one of the players is not enough to ensure that the arbitration-driven equilibrium obtains. Indeed, if the arbitrated outcome is not balanced,
12
More precisely, their Proposition 1 would imply that if i s i " > ( s i + " ) for some i, only the arbitration driven equilibrium would obtain, whereas if ii s i " (s i + ") 8i a m ultiplicity o f p a y o could be supported in equilibrium. Turning to our model, however, i is compatible with the requirements the Rubinsteinian equilibrium could result.
Once again, the reasons for this contrast between the arbitration model of this paper and outside option models is to be found in the crucial dierence between the two structures, namely the fact that the exploitation of one's outside option is a unilateral decision, whereas for the arbitrated outcome to beimplemented preference of both bargainers for arbitration is needed.
Concluding Remarks
A crucial feature of our model is that both players must give their consent before the arbitrator is called in. This assumption, although not universally correct, is consistent with a large number of institutional contexts. In the UK in particular, it is the case that labour disputes are resolved by nal oer arbitration (FOA) only with the consent of both parties (e.g. Milner (1993) ). This feature has been sometimes overlooked in the literature on the arbitration phase, which is largely inuenced by the US institutional setting where in many cases FOA is automatically triggered by law if the negotiations reach a certain stage 13 . For that type of institutional setting, our modelling strategy would essentially yield the bargaining model with outside options (Ponsati and Sakovics (1995) ) discussed before, where delayed agreements are possible. Compte and Jehiel (1995) consider a very dierent model, in which players alternate in making concessions and there is an exogenous probability of breakdown, as well as an exogenous probability that arbitration for the Rubinstenian equilibrium to obtain, namely s i Consequently under i our model allows for a continuum of payos to be supported in equilibrium. On the contrary, i f ii holds, then it implies "
(1 )si 1+ 8i, which requires "
(1 )min[s1;s2] 1+ = " . But then the arbitration-driven equilibrium can never obtain, so that a continuum of equilibrium payos is ruled out.
13
Moreover, Steve Brams has pointed out to us that even in the United States it did not take a l a w for both sides to consent to the use of FOA in major league baseball, beginning in 1975. Although the teams have w on more cases than the players, there is no movement on the part of the players to revoke FOA. This may b e i n terpreted as players consenting to`lose' on average. is triggered automatically. In that case, delayed agreements can be supported as the unique s.p.e. unless the arbitrator is called in immediately.
In addition, although our motivation comes from the interest in the link between arbitration and negotiation, at a more abstract level our model could beinterpreted in other ways. The action`propose arbitration' can in fact be any action such that, with the agreement of the other player, leads to a specic, commonly known, partition (possibly in expected terms). For example, this action can bethe message`let's ip a fair coin'. Or, suppose that there exists an obviously focal or \fair" partition s: then the action could be the message`let's go for s'. In other words, the presence of a third party is not crucial. What is crucial is the presence of a proposal which has the following two features: a) like a n outside option, it involves \stepping out" of the negotiations over the pie; b) unlike an outside option, it requires the consent of the other party before being implemented.
We hope that with this relatively simple and natural structure we have been able to demonstrate the following facts:
